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Abstract 
The paradoxical behaviour of a new command and control concept called Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC) provides the motivation for this paper.  In it, a traditional hierarchical 
command and control organisation was pitted against a network centric alternative on a 
common task, played thirty times, by two teams.  Multiple regression was used to undertake 
a simple form of time series analysis.  It revealed that whilst the NEC condition ended up being 
slightly slower than its hierarchical counterpart, it was able to balance and optimize all three 
of the performance variables measured (task time, enemies neutralized and attrition).  From 
this it is argued that a useful conceptual response is not to consider NEC as an end product 
comprised of networked computers and standard operating procedures, nor to regard the 
human system interaction as inherently stable, but rather to view it as a set of initial 
conditions from which the most adaptable component of all can be harnessed: the human. 
Keywords: Command and control, system design and evaluation, time series analysis.  
Introduction 
This paper is motivated by a number of intriguing observations made during a large-scale 
simulated command and control exercise (Walker et al., 2009; Stanton et al., 2009).  The 
exercise had the explicit aim of testing a new method of collaborative working supported by 
a networked ‘infostructure’ commonly referred to as Network Enabled Capability (NEC; e.g. 
Ferbrache, 2005; Alberts, 2003; Alberts, Gartska & Stein, 1999).  When the subsequent task 
analysis was scrutinised it was found that this socio-technical system was exhibiting unusual 
behaviour.  Over time it became progressively more preoccupied with the ‘means’ to achieve 
a given end (the ‘process’) rather than the massing of objectives or ‘end states’ (the ‘output’).  
The latter focus on outputs is what is normally expected from NEC and what was expected in 
this case.  Despite the provision of a networked information infrastructure, individuals and 
teams either used it in unpredictable ways or else adopted more familiar and presumably 
easier methods of working.  To paraphrase Clegg (2000), what was witnessed were “people 
interpreting the system, amending it, massaging it and making such adjustments as they saw 
fit and/or were able to undertake” (p. 467).  Paradoxically, what was designed to be a highly 
rational operation end up growing quite irrational (Ritzer, 1993, p.22).  Experience over 
centuries of military command and control (e.g. Regan, 1991) make it possible to go further; 
the sociotechnical infrastructure put in place to manage large, complex, dynamic resource 
systems such as these can, if not designed correctly, actively create inefficiency (instead of 
efficiency), unpredictability (instead of predictability), incalculability (instead of calculability) 
and a complete loss of control (Ritzer, 1993; Trist & Bamforth, 1951).  These are the 
antithetical problems, ironies, productivity paradoxes and ‘irrationalities of rationality’ (Ritzer, 
1993) that, when all else fails – as in this case - fall into the domain of Applied Ergonomics.   
 
On closer inspection findings such as these are common, both in the field of military command 
and control and more generally in the sociotechnical literature.  In the former case several 
studies have observed sub-optimal performance in terms of performance time (or the so-
called Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop; Stanton, et al., 2009), task accuracy (or more 
specifically fratricide/friendly fire; Rafferty et al., 2012), not to mention overall system 
effectiveness.  The UK’s nascent NEC capability has already been the subject of a high profile 
parliamentary inquiry due to £4.7bn of expenditure failing to translate into more effective 
command and control (House of Commons, 2007).  The wider sociotechnical literature 
presents an interesting counterpoint.  It abounds with examples of favourable ‘joint 
optimisation’ of people and management infrastructures (e.g. Walker et al., 2008; Teram, 
1991; Trist, 1978; Davis, 1977), demonstrating the contribution a user-centred approach to 
organisational design can make.  Indeed, if military operations really are as enormously 
complex as commentators feel, and complexity theory is the appropriate response, then by 
extension command and control should organise best from the bottom-up (Cebrowski & 
Gartska, 1998, p. 4-5).  In other words, the component in these systems best able to cope with 
complexity is the humans.  This creates a different interpretation of the results that motivate 
this study.   
 
Drawing from the emerging world of networked technologies such as the internet (the world 
from whence NEC concepts seem to have been derived in most cases) it is possible to discern 
powerful new trends whereby this form of human adaptability, far from being commanded 
and controlled out of existence, is instead actively exploited.  From the sublime (e.g. the 
Human Genome Project) to the ephemeral (e.g. Facebook), both are networked, highly 
distributed systems embodying the diffuse non-linear causality of peers influencing peers 
(Kelly, 1995; Tapscott & Williams, 2006; Viegas, Wattenberg & McKeon, 2007).  These are 
entities where the boundary between designers and users has become “highly blurred, highly 
permeable, or non-existent” (Scacchi, 2004, p. 6-7).  Under these ‘initial conditions’ highly 
effective and agile forms of organisational infrastructure have ‘emerged’ rather than been 
created.  To use Toffler’s (1981) or Tapscott and William’s (2007) phraseology, the participants 
in the motivating case study behaved rather like ‘prosumers’, individuals who see the ability 
to adapt, massage, cajole and generally ‘hack’ a new technology as a birth right (p. 32).  In the 
Ergonomics world Shorrock and Straeter (2006) remind us that people are still needed in 
complex command and control systems precisely because of this, and that human adaptability 
is inevitable (Hollnagel, 1993).  So perhaps a more useful way to look at NEC is not to see it as 
an end product or an entity that ‘is’ something, but rather as a process, something that 
‘becomes’ (e.g. Houghton et al., 2006).  It seems possible to go even further, to argue that an 
alternative conception of NEC is not something that can be called a finished article, but rather 
as the initial conditions from which the most adaptable component of all, the humans in the 
system, create the end product most useful for their particular set of circumstances.  Even 
then, this adaptation may prove fleeting and highly context dependant.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to take the anecdotal evidence observed in the field and try to 
recreate, if not the exact situation, then at least conceptually similar conditions in the 
laboratory.  The advantage of this, of course, is the degree of control that can be imposed, 
control that was almost entirely lacking in the case study example that has brought us to this 
point.  Caution, however, needs to be exercised.  Paradoxically, too much control could 
conceivably prevent the emergence of the adaptive behaviour being sought, so a novel 
approach to experimental design needs to be adopted.  In the present study what might be 
referred to as a classic hierarchical command and control organisation (so called ‘classic C2’) 
was created within a simulated environment, then pitted against a peer-to-peer NEC 
counterpart, both of which contained live actors who had to operate within a complex, 
adaptive, high tempo scenario.  Both conditions represent ‘frameworks’ that people 
undertake a common task within but different constraints apply to the different conditions.  
For example, there is relatively little in the way of rigid task specification in the NEC condition 
(the focus is on outcomes not actions) and the technological infrastructure is configured to 
facilitate peer-to-peer interaction.  The opposite is true for the C2 condition.  Here there is a 
high degree of ‘scripting of tasks’ and a more constrained technological infrastructure within 
which this occurs.   
 
Manipulations such as these have (and continue) to be of importance within the Ergonomic 
literature (e.g. Sinclair et al., 2012).  The research question links to wider debates within 
Applied Ergonomics around collaboration (e.g. Patel, Pettitt & Wilson, 2012) and 
organisational/group learning (Guimaraes, Anzanello & Renner, 2012).  The same artefacts 
have been observed beyond the field of Ergonomics in a number of recent studies in the 
specialised command and control literature (Stanton et al., 2012; Stanton et al., 2009; 
Bordetsky & Netzer, 2010).  Common to these studies is a break from the traditional human 
centred approaches wherein the interaction and subsequent representations are generally 
static (Lee, 2001; Woods & Dekker, 2000).  In this study we continue to assume they are 
dynamic.  There is a good basis for this.  Patrick, James and Ahmed (2006) for one recognise 
the ‘unfolding’ nature of command and control in their particular ‘process based’ 
methodology.  They state that, “A critical feature of command and control in safety critical 
systems is not only the dynamically evolving situation or state of the plant but also the 
fluctuating responsibilities, goals and interaction of team members” (p. 1396).  Our 
experimental design needs to take such factors into consideration but there is a trade-off.  The 
link between the ‘unfolding’ nature of command and control and the resulting human 
interaction is no longer a direct one.  There is also the likelihood of hidden variables that 
cannot be known in advance.  Despite this there is a wider cybernetic principle at work: “if all 
the variables are tightly coupled, and if you can truly manipulate one [or a few] of them in all 
its freedoms, then you can indirectly control all of them” (Kelly, 1994, p. 121).  In regard to 
human performance under different command and control paradigms the central question is 
related as much to the outright relative performance of the two organisations, the ‘short term’ 
end product (and what is normally measured) as it is to the pattern of adaptation and how 
performance changes over time, or the ‘long term’ end product.  In other words, the central 
question relates to the system that the users ‘design for themselves’ by undertaking whatever 
adaptations they feel able and necessary, factors that are not normally measured.  Whilst the 
promise of NEC leads us to anticipate better initial conditions for more effective adaptation, 
the sociotechnical ‘model’ needs to be run in order to find out.   
 
Method 
 
Design 
The experimental task is based around a simplified ‘Military Operations in Urban Terrain’ 
(MOUT) game called ‘Safe houses’.  The game creates a dual task paradigm.  The first task 
involves a commander managing two live fire teams as they negotiate an urban environment 
en-route to a ‘safehouse’.  The second task involves the commander managing the activities 
of ten further simulated fireteams within a much wider Area of Operations.  The two tasks 
interact such that success in one does not necessarily connote success overall.  It falls to the 
commander to effectively balance task demands under the independent, between subjects 
variable of command and control ‘type’, which has two levels: NEC and C2.  The study is 
longitudinal in nature.  The two teams (NEC and C2) separately undertook a total of thirty 
iterations through the same dynamic task paradigm and a form of time series analysis was 
employed to reveal the underlying ‘adaptive model’ embedded in the data.  Participant 
matching and task randomisation were employed to control for individual differences and task 
artefacts respectively.  The dependant variables focus on performance and were as follows:   
 
 Task completion time, 
 Attrition 
 Enemies Neutralised. 
 
Good performance in terms of these task based measures equates to the shortest time taken, 
all en-route Target Areas of Interest (TAI’s) correctly located and effected, and a high ratio of 
enemy to friendly agents neutralised.  In general terms, prior research would lead us to 
hypothesise that the simple organisation design (NEC) will allow the actors to perform more 
complex tasks, thereby exhibiting greater degrees of adaptability from initial conditions.  This 
is compared to the more complex organisation (C2) which requires actors to perform a greater 
number of simpler, more scripted tasks, in which it might be anticipated that greater, more 
malevolent environmental dynamism and complexity will arise along with poorer agility and 
performance.   
 
Participants 
There are five principal roles in the study, three of which were occupied by experimental 
participants (all aged 21) who were recruited from Brunel University.  The remaining two roles 
were filled by the experimenters.   
 
The participants were recruited via on-campus media and publicity and were not previously 
known by the experimental team.  It should be emphasised that the experimental team did 
not interact/engage with the participants beyond the requirements of their assigned role, and 
the study was monitored throughout by a senior lead investigator.  The five principal roles 
were as follows: 
 
NEC System Operator (Experimenter): In general, the NEC System Operator deals with 
the experimental aspects of the Commander’s Primary Task (managing the fire teams) as well 
as the NEC system itself.  Thus the first experimenter effectively ‘drives’ the NEC command 
wall system, receiving requests to add/append data to the live maps from the commander 
and helping them to use the system themselves.  The system operator also supplies strategic 
‘injects’ according to pre-set rules dependent on experimental condition and the state of 
game play.  In the NEC condition, the experimenter also provides situational updates to all 
team members (ensuring that ‘everyone’ knows ‘everything’).  The NEC system operator did 
not provide any interaction beyond these requirements. 
 
Commander (Participant):  The incumbent of this role was in charge of both fire teams 
(within the Primary Task), providing guidance and strategy as required, they were also 
responsible for the larger strategic Secondary Task.   
 
Fire team Alpha (Participant):  This participant was located within the live battlespace and 
communicated to the commander, and depending on experimental condition, the other fire 
team as well, by using an XDA mobile device and MSN Messenger™.  The XDA device also 
enabled the fire team to be live tracked and represented on the commander’s command wall 
representation of the battlespace.   
 
Fire team Bravo (Participant):  This participant had the same role and capabilities as Fire 
team Alpha.   
 
Enemy (Experimenter):  This individual, like the NEC system operator, was another 
member of the experimental team physically separated from the battlespace and from the 
commander.  They were in charge of playing the commander (to the best of their abilities) in 
the Secondary Task, thus they controlled enemy actions in a ‘wizard of oz’ fashion.  The 
instructions given to this role were explicit: to ‘try and beat their opponent’, whom they did 
not know or see for the duration of the study.   
 
Materials 
 
Command and Control Microworld:  Figure 1 presents a visual representation of the 
command and control microworld within which the Safehouses game was implemented.   
 
FIGURE 1 – COMMAND AND CONTROL MICROWORLD 
 
The system operator and commander were co-located in Brunel University’s BIT Lab.  Both sat 
with a clear view of the command wall which contained a Google Earth™ representation of 
the virtual battlespace with the position of the fire teams represented by an icon derived from 
GPS data (thus positional tracking of the fire teams was live).  This visualisation window was 
supplemented by a planning window which contained a map based representation of the 
same environment with a grid square coordinate system.  The planning window allowed the 
system operator and commander to add, delete and move objects as required by the primary 
and secondary tasks, which were then instantaneously represented on the main visualisation 
window.  The planning window was populated by the experimenter (before the condition 
commenced) with all the required TAI’s and enemy icons according to a pre-set template 
randomly selected for that trial.  The commander and system operator had separate work 
stations and their own computer, and communicated purely through text based means (using 
MSN Messenger™).   
 
Both fire teams (Alpha and Bravo) were located in the Brunel Battlespace, away from the co-
located commander and system operator.  The fire teams carried an XDA mobile phone 
device.  This permitted them to be live tracked using GPS.  The XDA device also allowed each 
fire team to communicate with each other and also, depending on experimental condition, 
the commander in the control centre (via MSN Messenger™).  Fireteams could add icons into 
their own version of the digital map which would then simultaneously appear on  each other’s 
screens and the main visualisation window in the control centre.  The digital map shown on 
the fireteams XDA screens was also used for navigation purposes.   
 
Command and Command Paradigms:  The NATO SAS-050 model of command and control 
(NATO, 2007) was used to design command architectures that exhibited appropriate NEC and 
C2 characteristics as shown in Table 1.   
 
TABLE 1 – NATO SAS 050 MODEL OF COMMAND AND CONTROL WAS USED TO DESIGN NEC AND C2 
COMMAND ORGANISATIONS WITH  THE APPROPRIATE CHARACTERISTICS 
 NEC C2 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
INFORMATION 
BROAD: fire teams are provided 
with regular situation updates 
from the system operator (in 
addition to being able to interact 
directly with their counterparts).  
‘Everyone’ knows ‘everything’. 
TIGHT: the commander is the only 
individual with an overall view of the 
situation.  The fire teams had a local 
view of their immediate location but 
in all other respects work in isolation.  
‘Everyone does not know 
everything’. 
PATTERNS OF 
INTERACTION 
DISTRIBUTED: all team member 
roles can speak to each other 
independently (there is no 
communications hierarchy). 
HIERARCHIAL: the sensor(s) and 
effector could speak to the 
commander but not directly to each 
other 
ALLOCATION OF 
DECISION RIGHTS 
PEER TO PEER: collaborative 
working encouraged and 
facilitated by outcomes based 
instructions and communications 
infrastructure. 
UNITARY: autonomy, authority and 
discretion rested with the 
commander who defined and 
scripted tasks. 
 
“Safe houses” Game (Primary Task): The goal of the primary task (that of the live fire team 
in the Brunel battlespace) is to: 
 
“Execute a concentrated and simultaneous operation to disrupt a named suspect by searching 
his house in order to gather evidence to disrupt and dislocate enemy force elements within 
that Area of Operations”(MoD, 2005). 
 
Practically, this involves the fire team choosing and negotiating a route through the urban 
battlespace in order to correctly locate and effect the safe house, dealing with Target Areas 
of Interest (TAI’s) en-route, with each team having to collaborate by providing cover for each 
other.   
 
Both fire teams start from the same location.  The location of the safe house, the final 
destination, is randomised for each trial but with distance from start point controlled.  The 
Area of Operations (AO) for the primary task is scattered with numerous TAI’s so that an equal 
number of TAI’s will be encountered ‘en-route’ (and regardless of route chosen).   
 
Firstly, each of these ‘en-route’ TAI’s has to be correctly located by one of the fire teams.  
Correct location of a TAI is judged to have occurred when the fire team takes up position at 
the same grid coordinates as the TAI.  Missing out a TAI by failure to locate it will result in the 
offending fire team being removed from the mission and having to return to the start point 
for the remainder of the trial.   
 
Secondly, assuming the en-route TAI has been correctly located, the fire team then has to 
‘effect’ it in order to make it safe for the other fire team to continue on their route.  Although 
the location of the TAI is known by the fire team and commander a-priori, what is not known 
is what form the TAI actually takes and the most appropriate way to ‘effect’ it.  This can only 
be judged by the fire team who are on the ground and are able to make that assessment based 
on a number of simple local characteristics.  These are as follows: 
 
 If the TAI is located on a building over three stories high then a ‘yellow effect’ will 
neutralise it (signified by the relevant fire team using their XDA to place a yellow icon 
on the appropriate grid coordinate). 
 If the TAI is located on a building less than three stories high, then a ‘blue effect’ will 
neutralise it (signified by a blue icon being placed). 
 If the TAI is located in a busy thorough fare with retail outlets then a ‘pink effect’ will 
neutralise it (signified by a pink icon). 
 
After confirmation that this information has been received, the relevant fireteam will hold in 
this position, providing cover for the other fireteam as they make their way to the next TAI.  
This ‘leapfrogging’ affect continues until, finally, the safehouse itself is located and effected in 
the same way.  It should be pointed out that in the NEC condition this leap frogging is 
facilitated by the fireteams being able to communicate directly with each other via their 
XDA’s, in the C2 condition, however, communication (and instructions) have to pass through 
and/or come from the commander.   
 
In order to further encourage the need for communication and interaction there is also a 
degree of built-in ambiguity in the positional data.  This means that part of the adaptive 
process of the entire team is to figure out ‘work arounds’ and modes of operation that enable 
these ambiguities to be resolved in whatever way is found to be most efficient.  For example, 
both teams developed a form of ‘communications protocol’ in which the field operatives 
reported-in whenever they began to move (due to lag in the positional data), and began to 
develop abbreviations and code words for locations around the Area of Operations.  Some of 
the adaptations that were possible, and might have been predicted in the NEC condition, 
failed to emerge in practice, as the Results describe in full. 
 
The need for good time and accuracy performance is embedded in the game by two simple 
game-play expedients.  As mentioned before, if the wrong location is chosen or the TAI is 
ignored then the fire team allocated to it fails the mission and has to sit out the remainder of 
the trial.  If the right location but wrong effect is applied then the fire team’s attrition score, 
which acts rather like a ‘life score’, starting at five and meaning ‘full strength’ through to zero, 
meaning ‘neutralised and unable to continue the task’, is decremented.  The attrition score is 
not just affected by accuracy but also speed and time.  Five time activated attrition injects 
occur randomly throughout the 15 minutes allotted to the trial, these cause both fire team’s 
attrition scores to be decremented.  As a result, the longer the fireteam takes, the longer they 
expose themselves to the deleterious effects of the experimental injects.  This combines with 
accuracy: the less accurate they are the lower the score. 
 
What appears to be a relatively complex set of rules becomes considerably simplified as far as 
the experimental participants are concerned.  The system operator (who is a member of the 
experimental team) undertakes all game play management tasks such as maintaining the 
formal record of ‘location accuracy’, ‘effect concordance’ (whether the right effect has been 
applied) the attrition score, enactment of the time based attrition injects, and communicates 
all of this to the commander as required.  
 
Secondary Task (Commander):  The commanders secondary task is based on the following 
mission: 
 
“Execute a concentrated and simultaneous operation to disrupt named suspects by searching 
their houses in order to gather evidence to disrupt and dislocate the enemy force within West 
London” 
 
Whilst the first task concerns the activities of a live fire team in a live environment, the 
secondary task of the commander is simulated and occurs in a much wider Area of Operations 
(the boundaries are six miles in either direction from the AO of the first task).  This larger 
strategic mission relies on the commander playing a competitive game against a simulated 
‘enemy’, played by the experimenter acting in a wizard of oz fashion.  Thus ‘live’ (small AO) 
and ‘simulated’ (large AO) elements are played simultaneously on the same NEC system. 
 
While the live fire team progress towards their primary target within their smaller AO, wider 
enemy activity is taking place all around which, if permitted to continue, will eventually 
impinge on the primary task.  Such impingement, under certain specified conditions, will mean 
that the primary task fails regardless of the efficacy of the fire teams.  The onus is thus on the 
commander to manage both tasks effectively. 
 
In the commander’s wider area of operations there are 15 enemy elements/icons dispersed 
randomly around the environment.  These icons are placed according to a random script for 
that trial by the experimenter acting in the ‘enemy’ role.   
 
Enemy icons, due to the asymmetry of most MOUT-type situation, are free to move across 
the battlespace at will (no area is restricted to them).  The commander has 25 friendly force 
icons/elements all massed in a defined ‘green zone’, this is their starting position.  Although 
more numerous, the friendly icons are not permitted to enter pre-defined ‘sensitive areas’.   
 
Apart from these constraints, the game plays like a virtual game of ‘draughts’ in which the grid 
square system of the map serves as a form of draughts board.  Only one icon can be moved, 
one square at a time (in any direction) in enemy reaction, friendly counter action, enemy 
counter re-action, and so on in sequence.   
 
If the friendly icon enters a grid square occupied by an enemy icon then the friendly icon wins.  
If the enemy icon enters a grid square occupied by a friendly icon, the enemy wins.  The 
experimenter playing the role of enemy updates the icons/map accordingly (and keeps a 
record of the game score).   
 
The enemy’s’ objectives are to reach several other enemy safe houses dotted around the AO 
(one of which is the primary target for the live fire team).  Every enemy icon that enters the 
grid square occupied by a safe house is safe and no longer available to be ‘captured or 
neutralised’ and thus no longer able to contribute to an ‘enemy captured/neutralised’ score.  
As a result, the onus on the commander is to capture/neutralise the enemies before they 
reach a safehouse, and preferably, neutralising the safehouse before enemies start to reach 
it, hence the phrase ‘disrupt’ and ‘dislocate’.   
 
Procedure 
 
Training Phase (Day #1):  The aims and objectives of the study are introduced in broad 
terms along with health and safety preliminaries and informed consent.  Detailed instructions 
on the task are then provided to all participants, supplemented with demonstrations and 
hands-on examples.  The experimenter then uses the pre-populated command wall to begin 
the first full trial which is identical in all respects to the experimental trials but serves as a 
practice (both teams are measured subsequently as an internal check on concordance 
between them). 
 
The sensor is equipped with the XDA and briefed by the commander, with the help of the 
study team, as to the mission objectives.  The start point of the study is Brunel University’s BIT 
Lab: the study is timed from the moment the fire teams leave.  The commander is seated in 
front of their own laptop computer and the command wall.  With all participants ready the 
practice trial commences with help, facilitation and intervention from the experimental team 
as required.  The System Operator manages the experimental tasks associated with the 
Primary Task (attrition scores, communications updates – where required and permitted - and 
timing).  The Enemy plays the commander concurrently according to the rules of the game.  
After a maximum of 15 minutes (or sooner if the Primary Task is complete) the trial is halted, 
the MSN transcripts are saved/archived along with those of the command wall’s system logs. 
 
Experimental Phase (Day #2 – 30):  With the participants familiar with the broad 
paradigm the teams begin to undertake the repeated iterations of the experimental trials in 
both conditions.  Issues and questions are dealt with before the trial starts and during it if 
required.  The task gets underway and the participants interact in the manner prescribed by 
the organisational type they are currently working within.   
 
Results  
To briefly recap, participants took part in a simulated MOUT mission over thirty successive 
iterations.  The analysis, therefore, focuses on how the different constraints of NEC and C2 
influenced the direction of team adaptation and performance.  It is hypothesised that NEC 
provides better conditions for adaptation but linear regression is used as a form of time series 
analysis (see also Agha & Alnahhal, 2012) in order to uncover the underlying theory behind 
the data and thus to test this supposition. 
 
Task Time 
Both teams (C2 and NEC) were measured in terms of how long it took the live fireteam to 
perform their task.  When this first task was complete then both tasks of the dual task 
paradigm were halted.  The maximum amount of time that was allowed to be spent on the 
task was 15 minutes (900 seconds).  As one would expect, over the course of the thirty 
iterations both teams sped up considerably and continued to do so for every trial.  A strong 
association between task time and trial was obtained for both conditions (NEC r = -0.84 and 
C2 r = -0.85), both of which were significant at beyond the 1% level.  Furthermore, the 
regression ANOVA supports the hypotheses that this association is linear in nature for the NEC 
condition: F(1,28) = 64.74; p < 0.01 and F(1,28)=73.53; p<0.01 for the C2 condition.   
 
 FIGURE 2 – SCATTERPLOT SHOWING THE REGRESSION LINES FOR BOTH NEC AND C2 CONDITIONS IN 
RELATION TO TASK TIME 
 
The linear regression model fitted to the data accounted for 69% of the variance in the NEC 
condition (Adjusted R2 = 0.69) and 71% of the variance in the C2 condition (Adjusted R2 = 0.71).  
Both values represent a large effect size and both regression models were statistically 
significant to beyond the 1% level.  The regression equation, however, differed between the 
two conditions.  The intercept for the C2 condition was at b0 = 862 seconds, somewhat nearer 
the maximum value of 900 seconds permissible for the task than the NEC condition, whose 
intercept was at b0 = 762 seconds.  However, the regression line for the C2 condition had a 
slightly more precipitous slope than that for the NEC condition, b1 = -14.26 compared to b1 = 
-19.73, thus despite the higher intercept the regression lines actually crossed at trial 17 
meaning that by trial 30 the regression model predicts the task being completed in 270 
seconds for the C2 condition compared to 334 seconds for the NEC condition (approximately 
a minute faster).  This represents a small effect (rbis = 0.17) but one that an analysis of 
covariance reveals as significant at the 7% level (t=1.88, df = 56, p = 0.07).  This is an 
encouraging finding given the exploratory nature of the study, its novel methodology and 
small sample size.  Taken in isolation it appears that that the NEC condition favours initial time 
adaptation with the C2 condition yielding longer term improvements and faster times.   
 
Attrition 
The live fire teams performing the primary task were given an attrition score rather similar to 
the kind of ‘lives left’ score given in computer games.  The attrition score, which begins at five, 
is diminished through a) time based injects, so the longer that is spent on the task the more 
chance there is of having the score decremented, and b), if locations of TAI’s and markers 
placed at them are inappropriate and/or inaccurate then the attrition score is also subtracted.  
A high attrition score connotes better performance. 
 
FIGURE 3 - SCATTERPLOT SHOWING THE REGRESSION LINES FOR BOTH NEC AND C2 CONDITIONS IN 
RELATION TO ATTRITION SCORE 
 
In both conditions the attrition score is positively correlated with the number of trials 
undertaken, r = 0.8, p < 0.01 for the NEC condition and r = 0.53, p <0.01 for the C2 condition.  
The regression ANOVA supports the hypothesis of linearity in both cases: F(1,28)=48.55; 
p<0.01 for NEC and F(1,28)=11.09; p<0.01 for C2.  Note, however, that despite the statistical 
significance of these regression diagnostics the C2 condition possess less statistical power in 
terms of its associative performance (r), linearity (F) and also in the amount of variance 
explained by the regression model (R2 = 0.26 compared to NEC’s 0.62).   
 
In model terms the regression coefficient (the slope of the regression line) was similar for NEC 
and C2, being 0.08 and 0.09 respectively.  The intercept values were, however, different.  The 
C2 model starts with a lower attrition score of 1.5 and maintains a subordinate position to 
NEC (whose intercept is 1.98) for the duration of the longitudinal testing and data collection 
intervals.  Both of these regression models were statistically significant to beyond the 1% level.  
An analysis of covariance confirms the visual impression of the data by detecting a very strong 
and statistically significant effect (t=47.2 x 104, df = 56, p < 0.01, rbis = 1.0).  So despite C2’s 
favourable evolution towards faster task completion times (as shown above) it is not all good 
news.  Attrition in the C2 condition is statistically worse than the NEC condition, in other 
words, additional organisational structure in the C2 condition does not necessarily lead to 
better performance.   
 
Enemies Neutralised 
This factor relates most strongly to the commander’s performance in the secondary task 
(within the wider area of operations).  It can be immediately noted that the commander was 
able to manage these competing tasks satisfactorily, with the secondary task at no time 
causing the premature cessation of the primary task.  That said, it did compete for the 
commander’s attention and thus influenced their performance.   
 
The assumptions underlying a linear approach to time series analysis are not met in the case 
of friendly versus enemy capture ratio.  In other words, trial number or task iteration appeared 
not to be a good predictor of this factor’s performance.  In both cases only small (r = 0.3/0.24) 
correlations were detected for NEC and C2 respectively, albeit statistically significant.  
However, the fact that the resultant regression model only explained around 6 to 9% of the 
variance in the data (R2 = 0.09/0.06), the hypothesis regarding linearity was not supported: 
F(1,28=2.75/1.64); p = ns and, furthermore, both regression models failed to reach 
significance (p = ns) means that this form of analysis is abandoned.  Given the lack of a linear 
relationship between trial and capture ratio a simple cross-sectional approach can be taken.   
 
Even here, however, an independent samples t-test failed to detect a statistically significant 
difference in capture ratio between NEC and C2 (t = 1.48; df = 58; p = ns).  Given that such a 
test possesses in excess of 80% power to detect medium effect sizes or larger, and that only 
a very small effect was actually detected (rbis = 0.04), means that there is a high degree of 
confidence in stating that the constraints imposed by both NEC and C2 conditions are not a 
particularly meaningful determinant of enemy versus friendly capture ratio.  In other words, 
C2 evolves towards faster task completion times, but with poorer accuracy, but both NEC and 
C2 are comparable in terms of the numbers of ‘friendlies’ and ‘enemies’ captured.   
 
Conclusions 
The results, in summary, show that the traditional command and control condition is good at 
optimizing task completion times, starting off slower than NEC but catching up and overtaking 
it.  Optimization of task time, however, comes with no benefit to other factors, in particular, 
the C2 condition is less accurate.  What the NEC condition loses in task time (approximately 1 
minute) it ‘gains’ in accuracy and remains stable in terms of enemies neutralized.  The main 
lesson to learn from this study is the instability of the human-system interaction and the 
impact this has on how future studies could or should be considered.  If the human-system 
interaction had been assumed to be stable the results would have been quite different.  Even 
allowing for not just one but several practice or control trials, the NEC condition would have 
posted faster task completion times than the traditional command and control condition.  The 
trade-off, of course, is that what is gained with a repeated measures study is lost in terms of 
the diversity and size of the sample.  To gain this back would inevitably require considerably 
more experimental resources than is presently common.  Thus a broader lesson can be 
extracted, which is to adopt a contingent approach.  To determine, first of all, the likely 
instability in the human-system interaction of interest and approach the study design with 
that in mind.  For ‘stable’ problems the conventional cross-sectional study will perform well.  
For ‘unstable’ interactions, the type of study undertaken here may well reveal the real 
underlying phenomena of interest.  In doing so, the present study gives us insights into the 
following:   
 
 The emergent nature of command and control:  Participants did indeed perform 
adaptations to the way they carried out their task within the confines of the study.  
This methodological success shows that these open-systems properties can be 
instantiated (and measured) in a laboratory setting, which...   
 …led to a degree of unpredictability in the NEC condition: This behaviour matched 
that observed in the previous live case study which motivated the current paper.  It 
was hypothesised that NEC would increase tempo, and had a static view of the human 
system interaction been taken this view could be upheld.  But with NEC representing 
an initial condition from which adaptations could take place, this hypothesis was not 
supported, however… 
 …are we comparing like with like?  With more than one factor to optimise is the fact 
that NEC was slower really very meaningful?  Perhaps not.  Whereas the more 
traditional hierarchical command and control condition accelerated task completion 
times this came at a cost to other factors, a cost that the NEC condition was able to 
trade-off and optimise.  How these two organisation types are able to balance and 
optimise more factors than those present in the current study requires further 
research, but the possible relationship between the ‘rigidity’ of a team structure (i.e. 
hierarchical command and control) versus its output flexibility (i.e. ability to optimise 
more than one process outcome) is an intriguing one with numerous analogues in the 
literature.   
 
As the case study(s) that have motivated this work have already hinted, NEC-like organisations 
often exhibit paradoxical behaviour.  The NEC condition ‘should’ have been faster, but 
actually, the scope of adjustments available (and actually made by the incumbents of the team 
roles) meant that task time was not elevated to the status of single most important priority.  
This, surely, is a desirable outcome given the inherent complexity, dynamism and asymmetry 
present in the context within which these organisations operate.  Perhaps this is the hallmark 
of what NEC is really all about?  The greater extent of open systems behaviour is what seems 
to enable the NEC organisation to undertake a more complex process of optimisation 
compared to its hierarchically organised counterpart.  The take home message seems to be 
that this situation can be made to arise by creating the optimum conditions for the most 
adaptable, open-systems component of all in NEC: the human. 
 
Note 
This paper operates in the domain of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) from which terms such 
as ‘effect’, ‘effector’ etc. are drawn.  The author’s acknowledge that ‘affect’ and ‘affector’ are 
more linguistically appropriate in most cases. 
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